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RESUMEN  
Este artículo analiza el nivel óptimo de impuestos ambientales en un modelo en el que 
un monopolista contaminador produce a lo largo de dos periodos. Suponemos que los 
costes de producción del monopolista sólo son conocidos por él y que el planificador, 
que puede inferir dichos costes observando el output que produce el monopolista 
durante el primer periodo, tiene la posibilidad de fijar impuestos ambientales que 
afectan a la emisiones; además, el monopolista puede elegir un nivel de output durante 
el primer periodo distinto del nivel óptimo al objeto de manipular las creencias del 
regulador. En este contexto, si el regulador valora mucho la calidad ambiental, el 
monopolista de coste bajo tiene incentivos a camuflarse por una empresa de coste alto 
para lograr que el impuesto del segundo periodo sea de menor cuantía. Esto lleva a la 
empresa de coste alto a producir, en el primer periodo, un nivel de output menor o igual 
que el correspondiente a la maximización miope de beneficios. El impuesto óptimo en 
el primer periodo cuando el output de la empresa señaliza el coste de producción es, 
pues, menor o igual que el que habría si el output no señalizase el coste. El nivel 
esperado de contaminación en el primer caso es también menor o igual que en el 
segundo. Por el contrario, cuando el regulador valora poco el medio ambiente, el 
impuesto ambiental se vuelve negativo (un subsidio por unidad de polución) y de mayor 
o igual cuantía en el contexto de señalización que en el contexto de no señalización. 
 
Palabras clave: Política de impuestos y subvenciones ambientales, empresa 




This paper aims to examine optimal environmental taxation in an incomplete-information 
two-period model in which a monopolistic firm produces and pollutes. It is assumed that 
the polluting firm is privately informed about its costs of production, and the 
policymaker, which can only infer the firm’s costs from observing the output produced in  
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the first period, has the chance to set environmental taxes to affect emissions; the 
emitter of pollution may then choose a non-optimal level of production in such a period 
in order to manipulate the policymaker’s beliefs concerning its costs. If the policymaker 
values environmental quality sufficiently, the low-cost polluter has an incentive to 
misrepresent itself as a high-cost firm in order to secure a low environmental tax in the 
second period. This leads the high-cost polluting firm to produce, in the first period, an 
output level that is not higher than output which would be optimal if only short-term 
considerations were taken into account. The optimal environmental tax rate in the first 
period, when the firm’s output is a signal of its cost, is then lower than or equal to what it 
would be if the firm’s output was not a signal of firm’s costs. The expected emissions in 
the former context are also lower than or equal to those in the latter case. By contrast, 
when the policymaker’s valuation of the environment is sufficiently low, the 
environmental tax is negative (a subsidy per unit of pollutant emitted) in both the 
signaling and non-signaling contexts and no less in the former context than in the latter. 
 
 
Keywords: Environmental tax and subsidy policy, monopolistic polluting firm, vertical 
asymmetric information, signaling and non-signaling 



































Many activities of production and consumption have significant environmental effects because of 
the widespread use of fossil fuels and other environmentally harmful substances. The size of 
such effects is of concern not only because of their impact on climate change but also because 
they influence other external costs. Economists have paid increasing attention to the question of 
whether it is possible to use economic instruments to improve the quality of the environment and, 
in particular, to mitigate the effects of emissions on climate change. 
Recent trends in many countries indicate that a wide range of incentive and information-
based public policy instruments have been developed for the purpose of environmental regulation 
(OECD, 2003). Traditional command-and-control regulation systems that impose emission 
standards have been criticized, in theoretical terms, for being inefficient. However, the fact that 
environmental taxes rely on a price mechanism rather than the administrative prices associated 
with command-and-control systems increases their efficiency and lowers overall compliance 
costs. In parallel, it has also been argued that environmental taxes produce the greatest reduction 
in pollution because firms attempt to reduce their costs, where necessary by introducing new 
technologies.  
The question of environmental taxes and their environmental effectiveness have been 
almost above criticism from an academic viewpoint since they were first proposed by Pigou 
(1920), who argued that taxes on emissions would reduce pollution in the most efficient way 
possible with virtually no distortion of the economy.1 The idea that taxing an undesirable activity 
such as pollution makes much more sense than taxing goods such as income, work or savings 
has been introduced in both the academic and political spheres. This concept of taxing unwanted 
activities was given impetus in the early 1990s when a number of economists suggested the so-
called “double dividend” theory.2  
In addition to the importance of environmental taxes in the theoretical agenda, in practice 
environment-related taxes are growing in importance across the industrial world. As indicated by 
OECD data (OECD, 2003), such taxes represented, in 1998, around 3 percent of GDP and raised 
7 percent of all tax revenues in the 21 OECD countries in 2000. South Korea was at the top of 
this league, with environmental taxes accounting for almost 12 percent of total tax revenues ⎯ 
                                                           
1 Actually, the Pigouvian tax, set at the marginal damage, is efficient only if the economy is otherwise undistorted. 
2 The “double dividend” theory will not be discussed in this paper. For a review on this subject, see, for example, 































salthough consisting entirely of taxes on oil products and vehicles. The OECD figures for other 
countries show that Norway, the UK and Denmark raise more than the average level of revenue 
through environment-related taxes. 
The OECD data also indicate that environmental tax revenues rose during the 1990s, 
partly because new taxes on waste and energy were introduced in many member countries. 
Several European countries and Japan tax power generation; Scandinavian countries and the 
Netherlands levy carbon dioxide taxes; Scandinavian countries, Denmark, Switzerland, France, 
Italy, the Czech Republic, Spain (region of Galicia), and Korea levy sulphur taxes on oil products 
and electricity generation; Sweden and France apply a nitrogen oxide tax; Denmark and Norway 
levy a tax on chlorinated solvents; Italy, the US and the Czech Republic are among countries 
which tax lubricant oils; Belgium, Canada and Sweden are among those which tax pesticides; 
and Sweden and the US tax commercial fertilizers. 
Finally, other prominent example is the US, where the Environmental Protection Agency 
reports that the number of economic mechanisms to reduce pollution rose from 40 in 1992 to at 
least 100 in 1997. Many taxes are levied at the state level, such as a litter tax in Washington 
State, a fertilizer tax in Iowa and a landfill tax in Massachusetts. 
Direct taxation on pollution and indirect environmental levies that have been introduced in 
many developed countries indicate a rising demand for a cleaner environment coupled with 
growing fiscal pressures. Although more recent research indicates that the cost of a cleaner 
environment may be somewhat higher than previously indicated by the “double-dividend” 
hypothesis,3 two conclusions hold: environment-related taxes still look like the least costly way of 
getting a clean environment,4 and they are becoming an increasingly important part of the fiscal 
systems of OECD countries (Morgenstern, 1995).  
The question of the level at which pollution taxes must be set has been explored to a great 
extent in the literature. Most models have assumed that all parties have perfect information about 
the technology of production and any other issue relevant to the polluters. However, less attention 
                                                           
3 The “double-dividend” theory was reframed by the more recent literature, which emphasizes the fact that 
environmental taxes may cause potentially significant distortions in the factors and product markets that undermine 
the “double-dividend” hypothesis, although virtually any environmental regulatory instrument (including taxes, 
regulations, and tradable emissions permits) tends to compound pre-existing distortions in the tax system ⎯ a cost 
that is recognized as “tax interactions” or “interdependency effects”. See Morgenstern (1995) for a discussion on this 
subject. 
4 Cairncross (1995) points out that countries that used environmental taxes have found them to be effective. For 
instance, when Sweden introduced in 1992 a tax of $6000 per ton on nitrous oxide emissions from power plants, 
average emissions fell by 35 percent in two years. Likewise, the Swedish sulphur tax, which was introduced in 1991, 































shas been paid to the case where there is incomplete information. On the assumption that the 
optimal strategy for pollution taxes may be very sensitive to the information structure assumed, 
the focus of the current paper is the case where the policymaker has imperfect information.5 That 
is, polluters are assumed to have an informational advantage concerning the technology of 
production they currently use (i.e., concerning their emissions) with respect to the policymaker. 
This source of informational asymmetry is not only a major difficulty in the policymaking arena, 
but it may also lead firms to have, in a dynamic setting, the potential and the incentive to exploit 
their advantage with the aim of undermining the intended goals of external parties such as the 
policymaker. After observing the firm’s actions in a given period, the policymaker has the potential 
to adjust its regulatory action for the next period. This may produce a conflict between the welfare 
and informational objectives that may significantly affect the optimal level of pollution taxes. 
When polluters have an informational advantage over third parties and they are large 
enough to have an effect on market and regulatory actions, it would seem appropriate to examine 
the regulator’s behavior in a dynamic context in which polluters act strategically. The aim of the 
current paper is to explore the extent to which the existence of vertical asymmetric information 
concerning the costs of polluting firms, and the possibility of signaling, affect the optimal level of 
pollution taxes in a dynamic context. In the model, we consider the case of a single polluter that 
may be of a low-cost or high-cost type. The firm and the policymaker are engaged in a two-period 
incomplete information game with the following timing. In period 1, the policymaker, without 
knowledge of the costs of the polluter, announces and commits to a per-unit environmental tax for 
this period, and the polluter then produces an output level which generates a given level of 
emissions. In period 2, the policymaker may use the level of output from the polluter to draw 
conclusions about the cost structure of the firm. The policymaker then sets a per unit output 
environmental tax. In the current paper two scenarios are examined: where the policymaker uses 
the output levels in period 1 to set the level of taxation in period 2 (the signaling context), and 
where the policymaker does not use these observations when setting the level of taxation in 
period 2 (the non-signaling context). Finally, the polluter chooses the output level for period 2. 
If we consider a monopolist whose production damages the environment, two types of 
distortions exist: the distortion due to the environmental damage and the distortion of the firm’s 
underproduction linked to the exercise of market power. As a consequence, the policymaker, 
when designing the optimal environmental tax in the non-signaling regime, simply balances the 
                                                           
5 Barigozzi and Villeneuve (2004) focus on the signaling effect in tax policy when agents are less informed about the 
effect of their consumption than the policymaker. In this setting, they show that optimal taxes in a symmetric 






























sproduction and the environmental damage. In such a trade-off, and although the monopolist’s 
expected output is lower than the socially efficient level and any output tax reduces its production 
further, a positive environmental tax is optimal when the policymaker’s valuation of the 
environment is high enough.  
In a signaling context, when selecting the optimal environmental tax for period 1, we must 
add two additional effects to be considered by the policymaker: The indirect- or strategic-signaling 
effect and the direct-signaling effect. The indirect-signaling effect works as follows: if the valuation 
of the environment is sufficiently high, a polluter with low costs has an incentive to misrepresent 
itself as a high-cost firm, with the aim of producing a lower environmental tax in period 2. This is 
understood by the policymaker and induces the policymaker to commit to a lower environmental 
tax in period 1 than it would have in the absence of signaling. In fact, in order to outweigh the 
incentive for a low-cost polluting firm to misrepresent itself as being high-cost, the policymaker 
has to make downward distortions of period 1 output more costly, which is achieved by reducing 
the amount of the environmental tax. The direct-signaling effect encourages the polluter to 
produce a lower output in period 1 than in the non-signaling context. This effect also produces 
pressure on the policymaker to set a lower environmental tax in the signaling context than in the 
non-signaling context.  
In the following sections the two-period environmental tax game is examined to find the 
equilibria. When the high-cost and low-cost polluting firms produce a different output at t=2, this is 
referred to as a separating sequential equilibrium. By contrast, when high-cost and low-cost firms 
produce the same output at t=2, this is referred to as a pooling sequential equilibrium. 
At deriving the separating sequential equilibrium of this two-period signaling game, it is 
shown that a high-cost polluter, to convince the policymaker that it is of a high-cost type, needs to 
distort its period 1 output below the profit-maximizing level as a monopolist. As a result, signaling 
significantly decreases the optimal period 1 environmental tax rate relative to the case in which 
signaling is absent. When the firm’s output of period 1 equals the profit-maximizing level as a 
monopolist, signaling does not affect the optimal period 1 environmental tax rate with respect to 
the non-signaling context. 
In the model, the case of a negative environmental tax (a subsidy per unit of pollutant 
emitted) also emerges in both contexts when the policymaker’s valuation of the environmental 
damage is sufficiently low. In these circumstances, the market distortion due to underproduction 
is much stronger than the distortion due to the environmental damage caused by polluting 
emissions and, thus, there is a subsidy per unit of pollutant emitted. Furthermore, in the signaling 





























smay lead the low-cost firm to increase its output level of period 1 (direct-signaling effect). The 
policymaker is thus induced in this way to increase the per-output subsidy with respect to the 
non-signaling context. In addition, and to reinforce the incentive of the high-cost firm to 
misrepresent itself as a low-cost firm, the policymaker has to make the upward distortions of 
period 1 output less costly (strategic-signaling effect). This is achieved by increasing the amount 
of the subsidy per unit of pollutant emitted. Summing up, these two effects reinforce each other 
and the environmental subsidy per unit of pollutant emitted in the signaling case is greater than or 
equal to the subsidy in the non-signaling case. 
The remainder of the paper is made up of six sections. In Section 2 the model is outlined. 
The separating sequential equilibrium of the signaling game is derived in Section 3, together with 
the optimal period 1 and period 2 emission taxes. Section 4 discusses the pooling sequential 
equilibrium and the environmental tax in a non-signaling regime. In Section 5, the signaling 
outcome and the non-signaling outcome are compared. Section 6 is devoted to the case in which 
the policymaker’s valuation of the environmental damage is sufficiently low. Conclusions are 
presented in Section 7. 
 
2. The model 
 
Consider a single industry constituted by a firm which is the sole producer for two periods, 
indexed by t=1,2.6 In each period, the inverse demand function for the good produced by such 
firm is assumed linear and, without further loss of generality, of the form 
 
t t t q q p − =1 ) ( ,                                                                (1) 
 
where pt denotes the unit price in period t when qt units of output are sold in this period.7 The 
absolute size of the market is normalized at one and the inverse demand function remains 
unchanged from one period to the other. 
In addition, assume that the firm’s production results in emissions that damage the 
environment. The emissions increase with the level of output. Particularly, and following Ulph 
(1996), each unit of the good produced causes one unit of polluting emissions in such a way that 
                                                           
6 The consideration of a monopolistic polluting firm tries to reflect the fact that companies in many polluting industries 
as, for instance, power stations are mostly large firms with market power. 
7 This demand comes from the maximization problem of a representative consumer with utility separable in money, 






























sthe environmental damage is measured, in each period, by the convex function of the pollution 
level 
 
2 ) 2 ( ) ( t t t q d q ED = ,                                                           (2) 
 
where   is an exogenous parameter that represents the valuation of the environment made 
by the policymaker or, alternatively, that measures the degree of ecological conscience.
0 > d
8
The marginal production cost of the polluting firm is constant and can take either a low or a 
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c                                                   (3) 
  
where  ) 1   , 0 ( ∈ γ  is taken as exogenous and technological parameter c, representing the efficiency 
gap between the high-cost firm and the low-cost firm, is assumed to satisfy  ) 1 ( 2 0 + < < d c  given 
the inverse demand defined in (1) and the pollution level function stated in (2). 
The policymaker uses the environmental tax the polluting firm has to pay per unit of 
pollution emitted as a decision variable to control the emissions in each production period.9 It is 
further assumed that both the polluting firm and the policymaker are risk-neutral, and that the 
discount factor between periods is one. 
The environmental-tax game involves four stages. At the beginning of period 1 (first stage) 
and before observing the output choice of the firm, the policymaker acts as a Stackelberg leader 
in setting the environmental tax for period 1, e1. The policymaker has worse information than the 
firm itself concerning the environment damage that it causes. The only thing which is common 
knowledge at this date is the distribution of the firm’s cost. Given the prior probability assessment 
that the polluter is a low-cost firm and the environmental tax chosen by the policymaker in period 
1, in the second stage of the game the monopolist acts as a Stackelberg follower in deciding the 
profit-maximizing output for period 1, q1. It is assumed that, at the end of this period, the 
monopolist’s output during period 1 is observed by the policymaker, from which its probability 
assessment regarding the monopolist’s marginal cost is updated. Let  ) ( 1 q γ  be the common 
updated probability assessment as to the likelihood of the polluting firm being of a low-cost type.  
                                                           
8 Such a parameter may also be interpreted as the marginal willingness to pay for decreasing the environmental 
damage by one unit.  





























sNext, at the beginning of period 2 and given the updated beliefs of the policymaker formed 
after observing the firm’s output in period 1, the policymaker announces and commits in the third 
stage to a period 2, per unit output environmental tax,  . Finally, in the fourth stage of the game, 




) ( 1 q γ  and the environmental tax   for the period.  2 e
As mentioned above, in each production period the policymaker asks for a per unit charge 
on emissions so as to maximize the total social surplus per period.10 This is composed of the 
unweighted sum of the consumer surplus, the firm’s profit and the governmental revenue from the 
pollution tax11 minus the environmental damage caused by the total pollution due to firm’s 
production. Namely,  
 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( t t t t t t t t t t q ED q T q Π q CS ) ( q W − + + =  
t t t t q e q q d + + − =
2 2 ) 2 ) 1 (( .                                                      (4) 
 
The equilibrium concept used for solving the proposed environmental-tax game is the 
sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson, 1982), in which the period 1 output must constitute a 
Bayesian-Cournot equilibrium, the period 2 output must be chosen optimally given the updated 
probability assessments, and beliefs must satisfy the Bayes’ rule (when it applies). In order to 
examine the role played by the information transmission on optimal environmental taxation, two 
types of sequential equilibria are considered: separating and pooling equilibria.12  
 
3. Separating sequential equilibria 
 
In a separating sequential equilibrium, period 1 output of the pollutant firm conveys full 
information concerning firm’s costs, by which the game of period 2 becomes a complete 
information game in which the policymaker is fully informed about the firm’s marginal cost. A 
                                                           
10 Administrative costs associated with the environmental taxes are considered to be negligible. This assumption is in 
accordance with the conclusions drawn, for instance, for the Swedish Environment Protection Agency (see SEPA, 
1997, p. 45). 
11 Policymaker’s revenues from pollution tax may be understood as an amount that is to the advantage of the 
community in the form of social expenditure or that may serve to alleviate some of the distorting taxes in the 
economy. 
12 Since the main purpose of the paper is to examine the role of signaling and the subsequent transmission of 
information on pollution taxes compared with the case in which signaling is absent, neither hybrid nor semi-































sseparating sequential equilibrium is, in this setting, a list of actions and beliefs 
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where subscripts H and L denote the high-cost and the low-cost firm, respectively. That is, the 
policymaker selects a period 1 environmental tax, e1, given the probability assessment of the 
polluting firm being of low-cost, and the polluter chooses a period 1 output level, q1, given the 
environmental tax to be paid. Next, for every q1 quoted, the policymaker forms an updated belief 
about the type of polluting firm and sets the optimal environmental tax for period 2, e2, and the 
polluter selects its output level, q2. The updated beliefs  ) ( 1 q γ  are unrestricted, except that Bayes’ 
rule is used to form them for actions with positive probability in equilibrium. As usual, a separating 
equilibrium such as that defined in (5)-(9) is determined by working backwards from the second 































Given the profit function of the polluter in period 2,  2 2 2 2 2 ) ~ 1 ( q e q q c Π − − − = , its optimal 
production level in such a period is given by13  
 
, 2 ) ~ 1 ( 2 2 e c q − − =   }, , 0 { ~ c c ∈                                                          (10) 
 
and the objective of the policymaker is to find the level of environmental tax that maximizes the 
social welfare at t=2. The resolution of the problem 
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yields the optimal environmental tax 
 
) 1 ( ) ~ 1 )( 1 ( 2 + − − = d c d e ,                                                         (12) 
 
where it can be observed that the lower the firm’s marginal cost the greater the environmental tax 
at period 2, whenever  . In this case, the policymaker places a high value on the 
environment, and the more (output and) pollutant emitted the higher the per unit output 
environmental tax. This leads the polluter to have an incentive to be perceived by the policymaker 
as a high-cost firm in period 2, in order to bear a lower environmental tax in the period. The 
contrary holds when  , in which case the environmental tax for period 2 becomes negative (a 
subsidy per unit of pollutant emitted) and higher when the firm is low-cost than when it is high-




Substituting the result from (12) into (10) affords both the optimal output produced by the 
monopolist (and the pollutant emitted)  ) 1 ( ) ~ 1 ( 2 + − = d c q  in period 2, by which its maximized 
profit in this period is 
 
. d c Π
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sDenote by  | L L q Π 2 2 ( ) 1 ) ( = ⋅ γ  the maximized profit of the low-cost monopolist in period 2 
when it signaled itself as a low-cost firm, and by  | L L q Π 2 2 ( ) 0 ) ( = ⋅ γ   the maximized profit of the 
low-cost monopolist in period 2 when it convinced the policymaker that it is a high-cost firm. 
Similarly, let  | H H q Π 2 2 ( ) 0 ) ( = ⋅ γ  be the maximized profit of the firm in period 2 when it is of high-
cost and signaled itself as such and  | H H q Π 2 2 ( ) 1 ) ( = ⋅ γ  the firm’s maximized profit of period 2 
when it is of high-cost type but the policymaker believes it is a low-cost firm. The following lemma 
summarizes the profits obtained by the polluter in the second period when it is honest and reveals 
its true type compared to the case in which it misrepresents itself as another type. 
 
Lemma 1. The emitter’s profits in period 2 are as follows: 
(i) If  , then  | 1 > d L L q Π 2 2 ( ) 0 ) ( = ⋅ γ > | L L q Π 2 2 ( ) 1 ) ( = ⋅ γ , when the polluter is a low-cost firm, and 
| H H q Π 2 2 ( ) 0 ) ( = ⋅ γ > | H H q Π 2 2 ( ) 1 ) ( = ⋅ γ , when it is of high-cost type. 
(ii) If  , the opposite holds.  1 < d
 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
 
The lemma states that, regardless of its true cost, the pollutant firm has an incentive to be 
perceived by the policymaker as a high-cost firm in period 2, whenever the policymaker’s 
valuation of the environmental damage is high enough. This is due to the fact that in this case the 
policymaker believes that the polluting firm generates a lower pollution level and, consequently, 




In this period, the firm’s marginal cost is private information. Given that the period 1 
environmental tax is announced and committed before the polluting firm produces, it is necessary 
to determine the optimal period 1 output of the firm for any pollution tax. In a separating 
sequential equilibrium, the polluting firm signals each one of its possible marginal costs by 
selecting a different output in period 1. Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that the signal   
sent by the high-cost polluting firm is associated with updated belief 
H q1
0 ) ( 1 = H q γ  and the signal 





























sequilibrium updated beliefs, it suffices that  1 ) ( 1 = z γ  for any other output level   satisfying 
.
1 z
} , { 1 1 1 L H q q z ∉ 14
Denoting by superscript m the monopoly regime, it is clear that to form part of a separating 
equilibrium the output produced in period 1 must satisfy the incentive compatibility conditions 
 
m
L L q q 1 1 = ,                                                                           (14) 
 
≤ − ) ( 1 1 1 H H
m
H q Π Π H H q Π 2 2 ( | ) 0 ) ( 1 = H q γ H H q Π 2 2 ( − | ) 1 ) ( 1 =
m




≥ − ) ( 1 1 1 H L
m
L q Π Π L L q Π 2 2 ( | ) 0 ) ( 1 =
m
L q γ L L q Π 2 2 ( − | ) 1 ) ( 1 = H q γ .                   (16) 
 
Succinctly, condition (14) indicates that the best a low-cost polluting firm can do in period 1 
is to produce the profit-maximizing output as a simple monopolist. Inequality (15) is the incentive 
compatibility condition for a high-cost polluting firm. It states that such a firm would prefer to 
produce output   in period 1 (an output that may or may not differ from the profit-maximizing 
output as a simple monopolist  ) and convince the policymaker that it is a high-cost firm, rather 
than produce the output that maximizes its profit in period 1 as a high-cost monopolist and then 
be perceived as a low-cost firm. Finally, condition (16) is the self-selection constraint for a low-
cost polluting firm. It establishes that such a firm would prefer to produce output   in period 1 
and be perceived as a low-cost firm, rather than be perceived as a high-cost firm by being obliged 
to produce output   in period 1. The resolution of these conditions enables us to obtain the 








Lemma 2. When  , the output produced by the emitter at t=1 that forms part of a separating 
sequential equilibrium is as follows: 
1 > d
(i)  ) 1 ( 2   ] ) 1 ( 4 )[ 1 ( 2 ) 1 ( 1 1 + − + − − − = d c c d d e q H  when the firm is of high-cost type, and 
m
L L q e q 1 1 1 2 ) 1 ( ≡ − =  when it is of low-cost, if parameters d and c satisfy 
0   ] ) 1 ( 4 [   ) 1 ( ) 1 ( < − + − − + c c d d c d ; 
                                                           































H H q e c q 1 1 1 2 ) 1 ( ≡ − − =  when the firm is of high-cost type and 
m
L L q e q 1 1 1 2 ) 1 ( ≡ − =  when it is 
a low-cost firm, if parameters d and c do not satisfy the inequality. 
 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
 
The incentive to mislead the policymaker about its marginal cost leads the high-cost 
polluting firm ⎯ in order to distinguish itself from the firm of low-cost type ⎯ to reduce its output 
of period 1 below the level that would maximize its profits as a simple monopolist in such a 
period, when its marginal cost is not very high. Conversely, the low-cost polluting firm reacts by 
simply producing in this period the output that equals the profit-maximizing level as a monopolist, 
. In other words, the informational asymmetry imposes a signaling cost on the high-cost 
firm, i.e. to the one that pollutes a little. Hence, signaling reduces the expected production of 
period 1 with respect to the level it would be if the polluting firm behaved as a simple monopolist 
and, as a consequence, reduces the environmental damage. This is the so-called non-trivial 
separating equilibrium (in short, NTSE). In contrast with this, when the high-cost firm is very 
inefficient compared with the low-cost firm, it need not produce less than   to separate itself 
from the low-cost firm, in which case the separating equilibrium that arises is a trivial separating 
equilibrium (henceforth TSE). Figure 1 depicts these two regions. 
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Fig. 1. Regions of Trivial and Non-Trivial Separating Equilibrium in the {d,c}-space (1<d<2) 
 
 
Now, the policymaker takes this unique separating equilibrium as given and determines the 





























senvironmental tax is the one from the following lemma, where superscript S denotes the 
separating equilibrium framework. 
 
Lemma 3. When   and the polluter signals its cost through the output it produces at t=1, the 
optimal pollution tax for such a period is as follows: 
1 > d
(i)  , ) ) 1 (   ] ) 1 ( 4 [   ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 (   ) ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ( 1 + − + − − − + − = d c c d d d d e
S γ if parameters d and c satisfy 
the condition  0   ] ) 1 ( 4 [   ) 1 ( ) 1 ( < − + − − + c c d d c d ; 
(ii)  ], ) 1 ( 1 [ ) ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ( 1 c d d e
S γ − − + − = otherwise. 
 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
 
Behind this environmental tax is the consideration of the environmental damage and the 
two above-mentioned signaling effects: the direct-signaling effect and the strategic-signaling 
effect. Part (i) of the lemma refers to the optimal environmental tax in the region of parameters 
(d,c) where a NTSE prevails. In this case, the optimal tax increases as parameter d increases, 
because this leads the policymaker to value the environmental damage more and the polluting 
firm to have a higher incentive to be perceived as a high-cost firm. This implies in turn an 
increase in the signaling cost of the high-cost firm as the policymaker increases the amount of the 
tax. The size of the environmental tax also increases as the probability of the polluting firm being 
efficient increases, because this makes it less likely that a signaling cost exists. However, the 
optimal environmental tax decreases as parameter c increases,  because the signaling cost 
decreases. In particular, when parameter c is high enough for a TSE to prevail, none of the cited 
effects hold, and hence the optimal tax will be lower than in the region where a NTSE exists. 
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  (18) 
 
if it is efficient. 
From (17) and (18) it immediately follows that under conditions of part (i) of Lemma 3 both 
the expected output level and the expected emissions in period 1 are lower than in the case in 
which the polluting firm behaved as a simple monopolist. 
 
4. Pooling sequential equilibria 
 
In a pooling sequential equilibrium, both the high-cost and the low-cost type of polluter decide to 
choose the same output level in period 1. So, no information can be inferred by the policymaker 
from the observation of the firm’s decision and its updated belief of the polluter being low-cost 
equals its prior assessment. A pooling sequential equilibrium is, in this framework, a list of actions 
and beliefs  ), ~ ( { 1 c e ), , ~ ( 1 1 e c q ), ( 1 q γ ), ~ ( 2 c e ), , ~ ( 2 2 e c q )} ~ ( 2 c e  of the form 
 
, ) ~ ( 1 1 e c e =  for all  }, , 0 { ~ c c ∈                                                       (19)      
 
, ) , ~ ( 1 1 1 q e c q =  for all  }, , 0 { ~ c c ∈                                                   (20) 
 
, ) ( 1 γ γ = q                                                                  (21) 
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where superscript P denotes a pooling equilibrium. As usual, such an equilibrium is determined 































In this period, the system of updated beliefs of the policymaker is the one defined in (3). So, given 
the output produced by the polluter in period 1, which is the same than that defined in (10), the 
problem the regulator seeks to solve is 
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and the optimal pollution tax, which follows straightforwardly from (24), is that of the following 
lemma. 
 
Lemma 4. When   and the firm’s output of period 1 does not signal the firm’s marginal cost, 
the optimal environmental tax chosen for period 2 is 
1 > d
] ) 1 ( 1 [ ) ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ( 2 c d d e
P γ − − + − = .  
 
When choosing the optimal environmental tax in a non-signaling context, the policymaker 
takes into account the fact that the firm’s expected output of period 2 is the one that simply 
corresponds to a monopoly. Thus, in the trade-off between underproduction due to the exercise 
of market power and environmental damage caused by production, it sets a positive 
environmental tax. As might have been expected, the amount of such an environmental tax 
increases as parameter d increases due to the increase in the regulator’s ecological conscience. 
Likewise, an increase in parameter γ leads to an increase in the environmental tax because the 
firm’s expected output, and, thus the firm’s pollutant emissions, increase. Finally, the 
environmental tax decreases as parameter c increases since the expected level both of the 
production and the pollutant emitted decrease. 
Substitution of this environmental tax into the outputs defined in (10) affords the output 
(and emissions) levels given by 
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sif the polluter is of high-cost type, and 
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The polluter’s output of period 1 forms part of a pooling sequential equilibrium whenever both 
types of the firm select the same output level in such a period. An output such as  , 
with associated posterior beliefs 





P q q q ∈
γ γ = ) ( 1
P q  jointly with the out-of-equilibrium beliefs  1 ) ( 1 = q γ  if 
 and 
P q q 1 1 < 0 ) ( 1 = q γ  if   should be proposed as a candidate to a pooling equilibrium. 
Nevertheless, none of them survive once the equilibrium-dominated outputs at establishing out-
of-equilibrium beliefs are eliminated. To see why, it suffices to consider that the output level   
forms part of a pooling only because 
P q q 1 1 >
P q1
. 1 ) ( 1 =
m
H q γ  The low-cost polluter, however, finds that the 
output   is dominated by the output   since the profit function   is strictly concave in 
the output and reaches a maximum at level 
m
H q1
P q1 ) ( 1 1 q Π L
m
L q q 1 1 =  satisfying  . So, the only 




L q q q 1 1 1 > >
m
H q1 0 ) ( 1 =
m
H q γ  
rather than  . 1 ) ( 1 =
m
H q γ  The pooling equilibrium proposed above is then broken. 
 
5. Comparing the signaling and non-signaling equilibria 
 
If the output produced by the polluter in period 1 is not a signal of its cost, then the output defining 
an equilibrium would correspond, in both production periods, to the output level derived in (25) 
and (26) above. Similarly, the optimal environmental tax would be, in both periods, the one 
derived in Lemma 4 above. As a consequence, any difference between environmental taxes   
and  , and outputs   and  , and   and   must be entirely attributed to the role of the 
output produced in period 1 as a signal of the firm’s costs. Regarding the environmental tax, the 








































sProposition 1. When   the optimal environmental tax rate settled by the policymaker in a 
dynamic setting is as follows:
1 > d
15
(i)   if parameters d and c satisfy the condition  , 2 1
P S e e < 0   ] ) 1 ( 4 [   ) 1 ( ) 1 ( < − + − − + c c d d c d ; 
(ii)   if parameters d and c satisfy  , 2 1
P S e e = 0   ] ) 1 ( 4 )[ 1 ( ) 1 ( ≥ − + − − + c c d d c d . 
 
Proof. Straightforward from Lemmas 3 and 4. 
 
The intuition behind this proposition is quite simple. In the NTSE, the signaling cost that the 
high-cost polluting firm (i.e., the one that pollutes a little) suffers is understood by the policymaker, 
which reduces the environmental tax rate with respect to the case where signaling is absent in 
order to decrease such a cost. In other words, if the environmental tax were increased in the 
signaling context, the high-cost firm would find it more difficult to be perceived as such. It would 
then be forced to reduce even more its period 1 output to separate itself from the low-cost firm, by 
which output in period 1 would be depressed even further from the expected level. This would be 
beneficial for the environmental damage, but harmful for the consumer surplus, the firm’s profit 
and the taxes accrued by the policymaker. Given that the sum of consumer surplus, the firm’s 
profits and the policymaker’s income outweigh the environmental damage, the policymaker 
significantly decreases the amount of environmental tax in the signaling context.  
Part (ii) of the proposition states, in turn, that when the signaling process is costless, any 
difference between the amount of   and that of   disappears. Figure 2 depicts the regions of 











                                                           
15 It can be shown that the optimal environmental tax rate is always placed below the marginal environmental cost 
irrespective of the signaling or non-signaling context. This result, which parallels Barnett (1980), Kennedy (1994) and 
Bárcena and Garzón (2002), among others, is due to the fact that the production level is already diminished by the 
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P S e e 2 1 =
d 
c 
Fig. 2. Optimal environmental tax in the {d,c}-space when the firm’s output signals its costs and viceversa 
 
The under-taxation existing in the signaling context increases, other things being equal, as 
parameter d increases. This is because any increase in parameter d reduces the size of the 
signaling effects. Likewise, the under-taxation decreases as parameters c increases because an 
increase in the gap of technological efficiency reduces the signaling cost of the high-cost firm. 
Finally, the under-taxation decreases as parameter γ increases, since the expected output and 
pollution emitted approximate those existing in the non-signaling context. All of this can be 
illustrated in the following numerical example: 
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sNext, we shall examine how the production level, environmental damage, and social welfare are 
affected by the fact that the polluting firm signals its costs. 
 
Corollary 1. (i) Compared to the non-signaling context, the following holds in the NTSE of the 
signaling game: 
(i.1)  ; 
P S q q 2 1 <
(i.2)  ;  
P S CS CS 2 1 <
(i.3)  ;  
P S Π Π 2 1 <
(i.4)  .  
P S W W 2 1 <
(ii) If a TSE prevails, no difference occurs between the signaling and non-signaling contexts. 
 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
 
Despite the fact that under signaling the policymaker levies a lower environmental tax than in the 
non-signaling context, the firm’s expected output of period 1 in the former context is not greater  
than in the latter. As a consequence, the expected pollutant emitted is not higher in the signaling 
context than in the non-signaling one. Similar reasoning applies to the expected consumer 
surplus, the firm’s profit and the level of social welfare.  
 
6. The case in which the valuation of the environmental quality is low 
 
When the policymaker’s valuation of the environmental quality is sufficiently low, the 
environmental tax for period 2 becomes negative (a subsidy per unit of pollutant emitted).16 In this 
case, the high-cost firm is interested in misrepresenting itself as a low-cost firm as a means to 
increase the amount of the subsidy received in period 2 and, thus, its profits in the second period 
(see Lemma 1). 
Under these circumstances the conditions needed for a separating equilibrium to exist are 
given by  
 
m
H H q q 1 1 = ,                                                                           (27) 
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≥ − ) ( 1 1 1 H H
m
H q Π Π H H q Π 2 2 ( | ) 1 ) ( 1 = L q γ H H q Π 2 2 ( − | ) 0 ) ( 1 =
m
H q γ .                 (29) 
 
Condition (27) indicates that the best a high-cost polluting firm can do in period 1 is to produce 
the profit-maximizing output as a simple monopolist. In turn, inequality (28) is the incentive 
compatibility condition for a low-cost monopolist and states that it would prefer to produce output 
 in period 1 (an output that may or may not differ from the profit-maximizing output as a simple 
monopolist,  ) and convince the policymaker it is a low-cost firm, rather than produce the 
output that maximizes its profit in period 1 as a low-cost monopolist and then be perceived as a 
high-cost firm. Finally, what condition (29) indicates is that the high-cost firm would prefer to 
produce output   in period 1 and be perceived as a high-cost firm, rather than be perceived as 
a low-cost firm through being obliged to produce output   in period 1. The resolution of these 
conditions enables us to obtain the period 1 outputs that form part of a separating sequential 








Lemma 5. When  , the polluter’s output in period 1 that forms part of a separating sequential 
equilibrium is as follows: 
1 < d
(i)  ) 1 ( 2   ] ) 3 ( 4 )[ 1 ( 2 ) 1 ( 1 1 d c c d d e c q L + + − − + − − =  when the firm is of low-cost type, and 
m
H H q e c q 1 1 1 2 ) 1 ( ≡ − − =  when it is of high-cost, if parameters d and c satisfy  the condition 
0   ] ) 3 ( 4 [   ) 1 ( ) 1 ( < + − − − + c c d d c d ; 
(ii) 
m
L L q e q 1 1 1 2 ) 1 ( ≡ − =  when the firm is of low-cost type and 
m
H H q e c q 1 1 1 2 ) 1 ( ≡ − − =  when it is 
a high-cost firm, if parameters d and c satisfy  0   ] ) 3 ( 4 [   ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ≥ + − − − + c c d d c d . 
 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
 
In this case, the incentive to disclose a low-cost leads the efficient firm to separate itself from the 
inefficient one by increasing its production in period 1 above the monopolist’s level, whenever the 





























ssimply producing the profit-maximizing level of a monopolist if the technological efficiency gap is 
high enough (the TSE contained in part (ii)). 
 




















Fig. 3. Regions of Trivial and Non-Trivial Separating Equilibrium when d<1 
 
 
Next, we are able to determine the optimal environmental tax in the signaling context. 
 
Lemma 6. When  and the polluter signals its cost through the output it produces at t=1, the 
optimal pollution tax for such a period is negative (a subsidy per unit of pollutant emitted) and 
given by 
1 < d
(i)  ( ), ) 1 (   ] ) 3 ( 4 [   ) 1 ( 1   ) ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ( 1 d c c d d c d d e
S + + − − − − + − = γ , if parameters d and c satisfy 
the condition  0   ] ) 3 ( 4 [   ) 1 ( ) 1 ( < + − − − + c c d d c d ; 
(ii)  ], 1 [ )) 1 ( ) 1 (( 1 c c d d e
S γ − − + − =  otherwise. 
 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
 
As mentioned before, the amount of the subsidy in this context depends on the importance of the 
underproduction in the light of the environmental damage, the direct-signaling effect, which leads 
the low-cost firm to set its output level above the short-term optimum in period 1, and the 
strategic-signaling effect, which provides the incentive for the high-cost firm to mimic a low-cost 
firm. The size of the subsidy decreases as parameter d increases since the valuation of the 
underproduction also decreases and the incentive of the firm to be understood as a low-cost firm 





























sbecause it both reduces output and the incentive of the polluter to be taken by the policymaker as 
a low-cost firm. Finally, the subsidy increases with the probability of a low-cost outcome since this 
increases the output produced and the amount of the two signaling effects. 
Taking into account both Lemma 6 above and the subsidy per unit of pollution emitted set 
in a non-signaling context,  ) 1 ( )] 1 )( 1 [( 2 d c c d e
P + − − − = γ , we can establish the following 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 2. The optimal environmental tax settled by the policymaker in a dynamic context 
when   is negative (a subsidy per unit of pollutant emitted) and evolves as follows:  1 < d
(i)  , 2 1
P S e e >  if parameters d and c satisfy the condition  0   ] ) 3 ( 4 [   ) 1 ( ) 1 ( < + − − − + c c d d c d ; 
(ii)  , 2 1
P S e e =  if parameters d and c satisfy  0   ] ) 3 ( 4 [   ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ≥ + − − − + c c d d c d . 
 
Part (i) refers to the case in which a NTSE exists. In this case, the signaling cost of the efficient 
firm that produces more than it would otherwise, in order to convey information to the 
policymaker, has the effect of increasing the amount of the subsidy as compared to the non-
signaling context (direct-signaling effect). The policymaker also increases the size of the subsidy 
in the signaling case with the aim of increasing the incentive of the high-cost firm to be perceived 
as a low-cost firm (strategic-signaling effect). In turn, part (ii) summarizes the case in which a 
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Fig. 4. Optimal environmental subsidy in the {d,c}-space when the firm’s output signals its costs and viceversa 
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Table 2. A numerical simulation when d<1. 
 
Corollary 2. (i) When   and compared to the non-signaling context, the following holds in the 
NTSE: 
1 < d
(i.1)  ; 
P S q q 2 1 >
(i.2)  ; 
P S CS CS 2 1 >
(i.3)  ; 
P S Π Π 2 1 >
(i.4)  . 
P S W W 2 1 >
(ii) If a TSE prevails, no difference occurs between the signaling and non-signaling contexts. 
 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
 
Results of part (i) are due to the fact that under signaling the policymaker levies a lower 
environmental tax than in the non-signaling context. Thus, the firm’s expected output of period 1 
in the former context is greater than in the latter and, as a consequence, the expected pollutant 
emitted is also higher in the signaling context than in the non-signaling one, as well as the 
expected consumer surplus, the firm’s profit and the level of social welfare. In the case in which 
the signaling is costless, the subsidy per unit of pollutant emitted is the same in both contexts 





























s7. Concluding remarks 
 
The analysis of pollution taxes and charges is relevant not only from the perspective of theories 
related to the environment, but also for political discussion. Policymakers need to understand how 
such instruments work when considering whether or not they should be introduced in the future 
and to what extent. The main purpose of this paper has been to examine the optimal pollution 
tax/subsidy policy in a polluting monopolistic industry in which the emitter’s costs are 
unobservable for the policymaker. In this case there is vertical asymmetric information, and the 
firm may or may not signal its costs through its output choices. An extensive search of the 
literature has not revealed any research into models of optimal environmental taxation that have 
considered this problem. The assumption that firms have private information and can transmit it 
by their behavior complicates the issue, since the policymaker must consider the signaling effects 
when the tax to be paid by the polluting firm is chosen. However, the assumption that firms have 
private information that the policymaker can only infer permits a closer approximation to real-life 
situations than the assumptions commonly made. 
In this context, a number of scenarios are examined depending upon the level of costs of the 
firm and the value attached to environmental degradation by the policymaker. The results shown 
above indicate that whenever the policymaker places a high value on environmental damage, the 
environmental tax in the case in which the monopolist signals its costs of production through the 
output it produces in the first period is not higher than when the firm does not signal such costs. 
The incentive of the monopolistic polluter to be perceived by the policymaker as a high-cost firm 
leads it to under-produce in the first period when the gap of technological efficiency is low enough 
(or simply to produce the non-signaling level in the first period when the gap is sufficiently high). 
Thus, in order to make it easier for the high-cost monopolist to be perceived as such, the 
policymaker reduces the environmental tax rate in the signaling framework with respect to the 
non-signaling one. In turn, when the policymaker’s valuation of the environmental damage is so 
low that consumption outweighs environmental damage, the pollutant tax becomes negative (a 
subsidy per unit of pollutant emitted) in both contexts, and its size in the signaling case is greater 
than or equal to that in the non-signaling context. 
This approach opens up a number of avenues for further research. For example, the model 
could be used to analyze the choice of the environmental tax/subsidy policy when multiple 
polluting firms co-exist and there is asymmetric information not only between each firm and the 
































Proof of Lemma 1. If the polluting firm is of low-cost type but it has signaled itself as a high-cost 
firm and, consequently, it must pay in period 2 the environmental tax designed for a high-cost 
firm, then its maximized profit in period 2 is given by 
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q L                                                                  (A1) 
 
Similarly, if the emitter is of high-cost type, but the policymaker believes that it is of low-cost firm, 
then its maximized profit in period 2 is   
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From (A1) and (A2), the result claimed in the lemma follows.                                                         É  
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H H .                          (A5) 
 
By taking condition (A4) as equality, the resulting second-degree equation has 
 
) 1 ( 2









c c d d e c
q H ,                                            (A6)                               
 
as roots, while the second-degree equation formed by taking condition (A5) as equality has the 
following roots 
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c c d d e
q H .                                           (A7) 
 
Denote by 
− r  the lowest root of the two obtained in (A6) and by   the lowest root of the two 
defined in (A7). Given that   the continuum of separating equilibria is formed by the 
interval of outputs given by   On the other hand, any period 1 output strictly less than 
 is a dominated-output for the high-cost polluting firm and thereby the separating equilibrium of 
minimum cost involves the output 
− s
,
− − < s r
]. , [ 1
− − ∈ s r q H
− s
. 1
− = s q H  It remains now to check when the equilibrium is a 
NTSE or a TSE. It is easy to check that 
− < − − ≡ s e c q
m
H 2 ) 1 ( 1 , when parameters d and c verify 
0   ] ) 1 ( 4 )[ 1 ( ) 1 ( < − + − − + c c d d c d . In such a case, period 1 outputs of the polluter that form 
part of the NTSE are   and 
− = s q H 1 , 1 1
m
L L q q =  which refers to part (i) of the lemma. Similarly, 
 when parameters d and c verify the condition 
− ≥ s q
m
H 1 0   ] ) 1 ( 4 )[ 1 ( ) 1 ( ≥ − + − − + c c d d c d  in 
which case the productions of the emitter as a simple monopolist, i.e.   if it is a high-cost firm 
and   if it is a low-cost firm, form part of a separating sequential equilibrium. This is the so-
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as first-order condition. Finally, solving (A.9) yields the result claimed in the lemma.                    É 
 
Proof of Lemma 4. Solving the first-order condition of problem (24), 
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the result holds. 
 
Proof of Corollary 1  
 
(i.1) From (17)-(18) and (25)-(26), we have  
 









P S q q q q q q γ γ γ γ − + − − + = −
2 ) 1 (
) ) ) 3 ( 4 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( )( 1 (
+
+ − − + −
=
d
c d c d d c γ
     (A11) 
 
which is negative by virtue of Proposition 1. 
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S q q Π γ γ − + =  in the non-signaling game. Comparing them, the result yields. 
(i.4) In the signaling game, the level of social welfare in equilibrium is given by 
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P q q e q q d W γ γ γ γ − + + − + − =  Tedious manipulation 
yields  , whenever 
P S W W 2 1 < 0   ] ) 1 ( 4 )[ 1 ( ) 1 ( < − + − − + c c d d c d .                                                                                
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for the high-cost firm. When condition (A12) is solved as equality, it yields the roots  
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and, similarly, condition (A13) affords  
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Denote by   the highest root of the two defined in (A14) and by   the highest root of the two 
defined in (A15). Given that  , the interval 
+ v
+ u
+ + >u v ] , [ 1
+ + ∈ v u q L  defines the continuum of 
separating equilibria. Among them, the separating equilibrium of minimum cost is  . 
Finally, it holds that 
+ =u q L 1
m
L q e u 1 1 2 ) 1 ( ≡ − >
+  when parameters d and c satisfy 
) 1 ( )] 3 ( 4 )[ 1 ( + > + − − d c d c d c , in which case a TSE emerges, while 
m
L q e u 1 1 2 ) 1 ( ≡ − ≤
+  
when  ) 1 ( )] 3 ( 4 )[ 1 ( + ≤ + − − d c d c d c , in which case there is a NTSE.                                     É 
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s(ii) By solving condition (A9) once it has been evaluated in  ( ) 2 ) 1 ( , 2 ) 1 ( ) , ( 1 1 1 1 e c e q q H L − − − = .     
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Proof of Corollary 2.  
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if it is a high-cost firm. In turn, in the non-signaling context, output levels (and pollutant emissions) 
are 
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for the low-cost firm, and 
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and   by virtue of Proposition 2. 
P S q q 2 1 >
(i.2) and (i.3) Straightforward. 
(i.4) Evaluating the level of social welfare in both regimes, we have 
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which is positive in the region where  ) 1 ( )] 3 ( 4 )[ 1 ( + ≤ + − − d c d c d c . 
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